Exploring the neural correlates of dream phenomenology and altered states of consciousness during sleep by Mutz, Julian & Javadi, Amir-Homayoun
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Mutz, Julian and Javadi, Amir-Homayoun  (2017) Exploring the neural correlates of dream phenomenology








Exploring the neural correlates of dream
phenomenology and altered states of consciousness
during sleep
Julian Mutz1,* and Amir-Homayoun Javadi2
1Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, School of Public Health, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College
London, London W21PG, UK and 2School of Psychology, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury,
CT27NP, UK
*Correspondence address. Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, School of Public Health, Imperial College London, LondonW21PG, UK.
Tel: þ44-(0)-20-7594-3686; E-mail: julian.mutz@gmail.com
Abstract
The science of dreaming constitutes a relevant topic in modern-day neuroscientific research and provides major insights into
the study of human consciousness. Linking specific, universal, and regularly occurring stages of sleep with dreaming encour-
ages the direct and systematic investigation of a topic that has fascinated humankind for centuries. In this review, we explore
to what extent individuals dream during periods of rapid eyemovement and non-rapid eyemovement sleep, and we introduce
research on lucid dreaming.We then discuss how dreaming during different stages of sleep varies in terms of phenomenologi-
cal characteristics, and to what extent individuals are conscious throughout the sleep cycle. Finally, we provide a synopsis of
the previous literature on brain activity during sleep, and we aim to clarify how the neurofunctional changes observed through-
out sleepmay lead to changes in phenomenological aspects of dreams, and in the domain of consciousness.
Key words: sleep and dreaming; consciousness; phenomenology; neuroscience; psychosis
Introduction
Sleep deceives by the ingenuity of its illusions, that there are no
certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish wakeful-
ness from sleep. From death, even.
—Philip Kerr, A Philosophical Investigation, 1992
Dreaming may be defined as a mental state, an altered state of
consciousness, which occurs during sleep. Dreams usually in-
volve fictive events that are organized in a story-like manner,
characterized by a range of internally generated sensory, per-
ceptual, and emotional experiences (Desseilles et al. 2011). The
world of dreams constitutes a major aspect of human experi-
ence and has both fascinated and mystified mankind since time
immemorial. Much has been speculated about the origin, mean-
ing, and purpose of dreaming, while the private nature of
dreams has made an objective analysis extremely difficult
(Horikawa et al. 2013). Early accounts of dream interpretation
suggested that dreams predict the future (Artemidorus 1975) or
reflect the current state of one’s mental health (Bond 1753). The
scientific investigation of dreaming only emerged during the
late 19th century and primarily focused on factors that influ-
ence dream content (e.g. odours) (Hervey de Saint-Denys 1867).
Throughout the past few decades, several biological and psy-
chological theories about the purpose of dreaming have been
put forward (Lavie and Hobson 1986; Barbera 2008). Whereas
earlier theories by psychoanalytic scholars suggested that
dreams constitute a meaningful reflection of unconscious pro-
cesses ‘whose psychic importance is equal to that of the con-
scious mind itself’ (Jung 1934, 139), others have argued that
dreams are not inherently meaningful. According to one of the
most prominent theories of the origin of dreams, the activation-
synthesis hypothesis, dreaming results from rapid eye
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movement (REM) sleep physiology (Hobson and McCarley 1977).
More recent theories suggest that dreams fulfil an adaptive
function related to emotion-regulation, learning, and memory
consolidation (e.g. Eiser 2005; Desseilles et al. 2011). Dreaming
may play an important role in reactivating and further consoli-
dating novel and individually relevant experiences that oc-
curred during waking hours (Cipolli et al. 2004; Schwartz 2010). It
might also constitute a biological defence mechanism, which
has evolved as a capacity to repeatedly simulate threatening sit-
uations (Revonsuo 2000).
In the present review, we provide an overview of the extent
to which dreaming occurs during different stages of sleep and
discuss how dreams vary in terms of phenomenological charac-
teristics and consciousness. To this end, one way of studying a
mechanism— such as consciousness—is to examine it in differ-
ent states of functionality. This is a necessary endeavour to
gather a comprehensive understanding of the overall function-
ality of the mechanism or process in question. We provide a
synopsis of the literature that explored the neural correlates of
dreaming and highlight some methodological issues in dream
research. Our aim is to clarify how the neural correlates of
dreams relate to changes in phenomenological characteristics
and features of consciousness throughout sleep.
Dreaming in Different Phases of Sleep
Every night individuals undergo several cycles of REM and non-
rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep (further described below) that
are on average 90–100min long. Dreaming often goes unnoticed,
and people tend to underestimate how often and how much
they dream (Nir and Tononi 2010). This is due to our tendency to
forget dreams, also known as dream amnesia (Roth et al. 1988).
REM sleep
During the early 1950s, Aserinsky and Kleitman (1953) discovered
REM sleep, which is characterized by REMs, global high-frequency
and low amplitude electroencephalogram (EEG) activity (similar to
the waking state), as well as increased heart rate, respiratory activ-
ity, and muscle atonia (i.e. temporary muscular paralysis; Jouvet
1994). In the early days of dream research, dream physiology was
equated with REM sleep physiology (Aserinsky and Kleitman 1953;
Dement and Kleitman 1957; Eiser 2005) because individuals are
most likely to report dreams after awaking from this phase of
sleep (Maquet et al. 1996, 2000; Nofzinger et al. 1997; Maquet 2000;
Fox et al. 2013). However, it is important to note that REM sleep
and dreaming can be dissociated: lesions in the forebrain can
leave REM sleep intact while dreaming ceases, whereas brain
stem lesions can prevent REM sleep from occurring while individ-
uals continue to report dreams after awakening (Solms 2000).
NREM sleep
Even though dream research has in the past mostly focused on
the study of REM sleep, awakenings from NREM sleep yielded
reports of dreaming as well (Foulkes 1962; Nielsen 2000; Nir and
Tononi 2010; Limosani et al. 2011). NREM sleep is now com-
monly divided into three different stages (N1, N2, and N3; Iber
et al. 2007) [N3 sleep, also known as deep sleep or slow-wave
sleep, was referred to as NREM sleep stages III and IV in earlier
terminology (Foulkes 1962).] and is in several ways physiologi-
cally distinct from REM sleep. NREM sleep is characterized by a
global low frequency and high amplitude EEG signal, slow and
regular breathing and heart rate, as well as low blood pressure.
Sleep stage N1 reports frequently contain accounts of dreaming
(80–90% of the time), but these reports tend to be shorter than
those following periods of REM sleep (Foulkes 1966). Reports af-
ter awakenings from NREM sleep N3 contained accounts of
dreaming 50–70% of the time (Nielsen 2000); only few reports
contained elements of dreaming after awakenings from
N3 sleep early during the night, when large slow waves are
most prevalent in the EEG signal (Stickgold et al. 2001). Sleep in-
ertia (i.e. the subjective feeling of grogginess following abrupt
awakening) after awakening from deep sleep (NREM sleep stage
N3) makes the evaluation of reports following these stages very
difficult, and it is unclear to what extent individuals are con-
scious during this phase (Chugh et al. 1996).
Dreams that were reported after awakenings from NREM
sleep were frequently attributed to confounding factors such as
recall of dreams from REM sleep periods or waking confabula-
tions (i.e. the unintentional production of false, distorted, or
misinterpreted memories). However, it is important to note that
reports of dreams after awakenings from NREM sleep are not
merely a recall of dreams that occurred during the REM sleep
phase (Nielsen 2000), because (1) dreaming has been reported
after awakenings from the first period of NREM sleep before the
occurrence of REM sleep (Nielsen 2000; Cavallero et al. 1992) and
(2) individuals reported dreams after awaking from short naps
that consisted of NREM sleep only (Suzuki et al. 2004; Carr and
Nielsen 2015). As such, it has been suggested that dreaming dur-
ing NREM sleep relates to “covert REM” brain activation pro-
cesses, which occur outside polysomnographically scored REM
sleep (Nielsen 2000). In line with this view, it is important to
realize that wakefulness, REM, and NREM sleep are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive phenomena (Mahowald and Schenck
2005); sleep is far from being homogenous in terms of mental
experiences. Hence, dreaming might be described along a con-
tinuum, ranging from thought-like mentation that is typical of
the early stages of NREM sleep to very vivid dreams that are
more typical of REM sleep (Desseilles et al. 2011).
Lucid dreaming
Lucid dreaming is a rare state of sleep in which individuals
achieve awareness of their own state of consciousness.
According to the most frequently used sleep scoring criteria, lu-
cid dreaming is considered being a part of REM sleep
(Rechtschaffen and Kales 1968; Iber et al. 2007) and typically oc-
curs during late night REM sleep periods (Voss et al. 2009).
However, recent preliminary evidence suggests that lucid
dreaming may also occur during periods of NREM sleep
(Stumbrys and Erlacher 2012). Lucid dreaming has a special sta-
tus compared with non-lucid REM and NREM dreaming because
it is a skill that needs to be trained and occurs only rarely in
untrained individuals. Dream lucidity can be achieved through
metacognitive training, developing autosuggestions, external
sensory stimulation, and through frequently contemplating
about one’s own state of consciousness (LaBerge 1980; Hearne
1983; Purcell et al. 1986; Stumbrys et al. 2012). Lucid dreaming it-
self might occur in different degrees, ranging from pre-lucid re-
flections (i.e. a minimal awareness that one is dreaming) to
deliberately controlling the dream narrative (Hearne 1982;
Tyson et al. 1984; Barrett 1992; Kahan and LaBerge 1994). Since
dream lucidity can be trained and signalized in experimental
settings by means of the eye-signalling technique (LaBerge et al.
1981), it constitutes a promising endeavour for dream and con-
sciousness research.
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Phenomenological Characteristics of Different
Sleep Phases
Many of the typical qualities of dreaming are similar to our wak-
ing experience. Such similarities include the full range of multi-
modal sensory qualities, colourful visual imagery, occasionally
realistic pain perception, as well as almost identical spatial or-
ganization (i.e. the experience of a real world with the dreamer
being at its centre) (Windt and Noreika 2011). However, Swiss
psychiatrist and founder of Analytical Psychology Carl Jung al-
ready recognized in his famous work On the Nature of Dreams
that dreams could be distinguished from wakefulness ‘by many
“bad qualities” such as lack of logic, questionable morality, un-
couth form, and apparent absurdity or nonsense’ (Jung 1945,
364). Interestingly, the phenomenological characteristics of
dreams in the various phases of the sleep cycle differ in several
ways.
REM sleep
Narrative. Particularly rich, emotional, and perceptually vivid
dream experiences have been reported after awakenings from
REM sleep (e.g. Foulkes 1962; Dresler et al. 2015). Dreaming dur-
ing REM sleep typically follows loose, fanciful, and often very bi-
zarre narratives; relates to current concerns; reflects interests,
personality, and mood; draws on long-term memory; and in-
volves social interactions (Hall and Van de Castle 1966; Domhoff
2003; Fox et al. 2013; Underwood 2013; Foulkes 2014). The
dreamer is often uncertain about time, space, and personal
identities and typically has the subjective experience of being
awake (Schwartz and Maquet 2002). Reports of dreaming tend
to be most elaborate and bizarre after waking up from the last
period of REM sleep (Hobson 2009).
Sensation and perception. Dreams share similarities with expe-
riences during wakefulness, since the perceptual modalities
that are utilized most during waking hours also dominate dur-
ing dreaming (Hobson 1989). Dream experiences are typically
characterized by a range of visual and auditory sensations,
physical activities such as self-motion or interaction with ob-
jects in the environment, and involve written and spoken lan-
guage (Desseilles et al. 2011). Reports of awakenings from REM
sleep contain significantly more accounts of sensory experi-
ences than do reports following NREM sleep (Carr and Nielsen
2015). Tactile percepts, odours, tastes, as well as pleasure and
pain are not as commonly reported following REM sleep awak-
enings (Hall and Van de Castle 1966; Domhoff 2003; Hobson
2009; Foulkes 2014). Oftentimes the sensational and perceptual
experiences of the dream world are unlike those which occur in
the world of wakefulness. Alterations from waking life experi-
ences include sensory distortions, misidentifications of charac-
ters and places, changes in spatio-temporal integration (e.g. the
integration of time and location of an event), misbinding of
objects’ features, dissociation, and transpositions (e.g. fre-
quent and abrupt changes in the dream narrative) (Desseilles
et al. 2011).
Emotion. Reports following REM sleep awakenings consis-
tently contain more emotional content than those following
NREM sleep (Wamsley et al. 2007). Dreamers tend to report ele-
vated levels of joy, surprise, anger, fear, and anxiety (Foulkes
et al. 1988; Strauch and Meier 1996; Fosse et al. 2001), whereas
sadness, guilt, and depressed affect tend to be less common.
A possible explanation for this finding might be less critical
self-reflection during dreams (Hobson et al. 2000). Since REM
dream reports frequently contain fear- and anxiety-related
elements (Valli and Revonsuo 2009), it has been suggested that
the realistic representation of fear in dreams and nightmares
serves as a threat simulation in a harmless environment in or-
der to prepare individuals for dangerous situations in real life
(Revonsuo 2000; Valli et al. 2005). It has also been shown that
several periods of dreaming during one night may be related to
the same emotional conflict (Offenkrantz and Rechtschaffen
1963).
NREM sleep
During the sleep-onset phase, individuals frequently experience
hypnagogic hallucinations while being unaware that they have
already fallen asleep (Underwood 2013). These experiences
share some similarities with dreams during REM sleep in terms
of dream bizarreness but are typically characterized by emo-
tional flatness (Foulkes and Vogel 1965; Vogel et al. 1972). They
are often static (Hobson et al. 2000; Hobson and Pace-Schott
2002) and usually involve no self-character (Foulkes 2014).
Activities that were performed before sleeping might influence
the content of such hallucinations (Stickgold et al. 2000;
Wamsley et al. 2010).
After the sleep-onset, NREM dreams are typically more
thought-like, fragmentary, and related to current concerns, un-
like the vivid, hallucinatory, and mainly visual content of REM
dreams (Eiser 2005). After awakenings from sleep stage N3 early
during the night, reports tend to be short, thought-like, less
vivid, less visual, less motorically animated, less emotional, and
less emotionally pleasant than REM reports, while being more
conceptual, more plausible, more concerned with current is-
sues, and typically involve greater volitional control
(Rechtschaffen 1973; Hobson et al. 2000). Late night NREM sleep
reports are usually longer and more hallucinatory, often indis-
tinguishable from REM sleep reports (Monroe et al. 1965;
Antrobus et al. 1995).
Similarities with psychosis
Interestingly, dream phenomenology has often been compared
with psychosis because dreams share large similarities with
many of the typical characteristics of psychosis and particularly
with the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g. false beliefs
due to incorrect inferences about reality or distorted sensory
perceptions that have no apparent external source) (Hobson
1989; Hobson et al. 2000; Hobson and Pace-Schott 2002; Limosani
et al. 2011; Windt and Noreika 2011; D’Agostino et al. 2013).
These similarities range from internally generated, vivid imag-
ery to intensified and often inappropriate affect as well as di-
minished ego functions (i.e. the capacity to distinguish what is
occurring in one’s mind and what is occurring in the outside
world). Most pronounced are elevated levels and uncritical ac-
ceptance of cognitive bizarreness, decreased reality testing, and
the delusional belief of being awake while dreaming (Limosani
et al. 2011). Furthermore, the dreamer lacks control of dream
events and often shows blunted distinction between first- and
third-person perspectives (Hobson et al. 1998; Schwartz and
Maquet 2002; Maquet et al. 2005). These observations are sup-
ported by functional magnetic resonance imagining data of
psychotic patients, which suggest that dream bizarreness
(i.e. improbability, incongruity, and vagueness) largely overlaps
with patients’ incongruous and bizarre waking experience
(for review, see Limosani et al. 2011). In fact, there are remark-
able similarities in terms of cognitive bizarreness between the
waking thoughts of individuals with psychosis, their dream
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reports, and the dream reports of healthy individuals (e.g.
Scarone et al. 2008). Interestingly though, the psychotic patients
differ from the healthy individuals in that they tend to judge
their dream reports as less bizarre (Lusignan et al. 2009); they
fail to distinguish self-generated and non-self-generated per-
cepts and perceive cognitive bizarreness as being real without
any critical reflection (D’Agostino et al. 2013).
Contrasting the state of lucid dreaming with psychosis,
Dresler et al. (2015) suggested that understanding lucidity during
dreams may shed light on the mechanisms underlying the lack
of insight into the delusional nature of one’s current state of
consciousness that patients with psychosis often suffer from.
Taken together, these findings indicate that there might be a
shared mechanism responsible for some of the features of
dreaming and psychosis (Limosani et al. 2011). However, a re-
cent paper by Mota et al. (2016) challenges this notion: psychotic
lucid dreamers reported more frequent control of their dreams
than non-psychotic lucid dreamers. As such, psychosis could
potentially amplify the experience of internal stimuli at the ex-
penses of external ones, enabling psychotic patients to better
control their internal reality than healthy individuals.
Changes in Level and Quality of Consciousness
during Sleep
‘Just as the psyche has a diurnal side which we call conscious-
ness, so also it has a nocturnal side: the unconscious psychic
activity which we apprehend as dreamlike fantasy’ (Jung 1934,
147). In line with this notion, Jung (1945, 364) suggested that
dreams are ‘fragment[s] of involuntary psychic activity, just
conscious enough to be reproducible in the waking state.’ Even
though this illustrates that dreaming and wakefulness likely
differ with regards to conscious experience, advances in cogni-
tive neuroscience and dream research reveal that these differ-
ences are not as clear-cut as originally assumed but can—in a
simplified model—be placed along a continuum (more complex
models assume a space of multiple dimensions; Voss and Voss
2014; Bayne et al. 2016). These range from no consciousness to
simple awareness of perception and emotion (i.e. primary
consciousness) to self-reflective awareness, abstract thinking,
volition, and metacognition (i.e. secondary consciousness,
also referred to as higher-order consciousness or self-
consciousness) (Morin 2006). [It should be noted that a number
of different models concerning the idea of levels of conscious-
ness have been proposed: for instance, the four-level structural
model of cognition by Brown (1976), Neisser’s (1997) five-level
model of consciousness, a three-level model by Schooler (2002),
or Block’s (1995) notion of phenomenal and access conscious-
ness. In the present review, we use the concepts of primary and
secondary consciousness to represent the general notions of
sensory awareness and higher level of awareness such as reflec-
tion, respectively. These concepts fit the purpose of our distinc-
tion between different states of consciousness during sleep
(Edelman 1992); they have been frequently used in the sleep
and dream research literature (Edelman 2003; Hobson and Voss
2011; Kahan and LaBerge 2011; D’Agostino et al. 2013; Voss et al.
2014; Zink and Pietrowsky 2015).]
One can generally differentiate between consciousness dur-
ing wakefulness, consciousness during dreaming, and non-
consciousness, with the possibility of intermediate states being
present (Limosani et al. 2011). Consciousness during waking
hours is characterized by the awareness of the external world,
our bodies, and our selves. When people are dreaming, they are
to some extent consciously aware of their internal world, have
sensory, perceptual, and emotional experiences but typically
fail to recognize their own condition, the bizarre features of the
dream world, their poor memory access, and their limited
thought capabilities (Hobson 2009). Dream consciousness and
waking consciousness may differ in terms of their origin (i.e.
their respective causal pathway), with the former partly repre-
senting an offline, internally generated simulation of the latter.
In line with this notion, it has been suggested that dreams may
be seen as a purer form of consciousness, which is free of the
constraints imposed by the perception of, and interaction with,
physical environments (Revonsuo 2006).
Early reports suggested a single-mindedness and isolation
during dreaming, which refers to the dreamer being absorbed in
the dream world without being aware of an alternative reality
(Rechtschaffen 1978). However, the nature, level, and quality of
conscious experience during sleep show large variability (Nir
and Tononi 2010). To some extent, this might be comparable to
the multiplicity of conscious substates that occur during wake-
fulness (e.g. task vs. default modes of the brain) (Singer and
Antrobus 1965; Raichle and Mintun 2006). Consciousness is
clearly not an all-or-nothing phenomenon but a multifaceted
concept with aspects varying across species, vigilance states
(i.e. the degree of responsiveness to stimuli), and health
conditions.
Although there is likely a consensus that consciousness ex-
ists while individuals are dreaming, there is an ongoing debate
as to whether consciousness exists during dreamless sleep as
well (Windt et al. 2016). Some authors argue that consciousness
continues throughout dreamless sleep, provided that one re-
mains aware of having slept. The topic of dreamless sleep is be-
yond the scope of this paper (for further discussions on this
issue, please see Thompson 2015; see also Windt 2015).
REM sleep
Dreams that occur during REM sleep showmostly aspects of pri-
mary but not of secondary consciousness. During REM sleep,
the dreamer tends to have less metacognitive activity (i.e. the
processes by which individuals monitor and control their own
cognitive processes), reflective thought, and volitional capabili-
ties (Kahan et al. 1997; Kahan and LaBerge 2011; Dresler et al.
2014). The dreamer has only limited access to information about
the past and anticipated future, and typically concerns him or
herself exclusively with the present content of the dream narra-
tive (Fox et al. 2013). However, some reports of REM dreams in-
volve reflective thought, such as puzzlement about improbable
or impossible events, contemplative alternatives in decision-
making, and reflection during social interactions (Wolman and
Kozmova 2007), as well as theory of mind processes (i.e. the
ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others) (Kahn
and Hobson 2005).
NREM sleep
Reports of conscious experience across NREM sleep phases vary
to a great extent (Rechtschaffen 1973). Although the frequency
of reporting dreams after NREM awakenings is sparse and gen-
erally less elaborate than after periods of REM sleep, which
might be due to the brain’s inability to encode memories of the
dreams (Massimini et al. 2005), the very existence of NREM
dream reports provides evidence for the idea that conscious-
ness does not fully cease during NREM sleep (e.g. Goodenough
et al. 1965; Suzuki et al. 2004).
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Lucid dreaming
Lucid dreaming is a hybrid state of consciousness with features
of both waking and dreaming (e.g. hallucinatory dream activity
combined with aspects of primary and secondary conscious-
ness such as self-reflective thought, abstract thinking, metacog-
nition, and agentive control) (Voss et al. 2009). Dresler et al.
(2014) recently investigated how volitional aspects of conscious-
ness vary across wakefulness, non-lucid, and lucid dreaming.
They found that levels of self-determination (i.e. the subjective
experience of acting freely according to one’s will) were similar
for lucid dreaming and wakefulness while being reduced in pe-
riods of non-lucid dreaming. Furthermore, planning ability
(i.e. how well organized one pursues plans and intentions)
seemed to be impaired during both non-lucid and lucid dream-
ing. However, this may be because it is not necessary to plan
during dreams and spontaneous execution of intentions is sim-
ply more common. Intention enactment (i.e. how promptly and
determined intentions are executed) was most pronounced dur-
ing lucid dreaming and did not differ between wakefulness and
non-lucid dreaming. This seems plausible because the lucid
dreamer is aware that obstacles in dreams are not real and can
easily be overcome (Dresler et al. 2014). In line with this, it has
been suggested that restored access to metacognitive abilities
and memory functions during lucid dreaming enable the
dreamer to execute his or her intentions (Metzinger 2004; Windt
and Metzinger 2007). Contrasting lucid dreaming and non-lucid
dreaming mirrors contrasting primary and secondary con-
sciousness (Dresler et al. 2009). Non-lucid REM sleep dreams
lack those very features of secondary consciousness, which are
the defining characteristic of dream lucidity. These include in-
sight, control over though and actions, as well as logical thought
(Voss et al. 2013). Interestingly, lucid dreaming may be the only
phenomenon that can be utilized to examine changes in pri-
mary and secondary consciousness in the same vigilance level
(Spoormaker et al. 2010) and therefore constitutes an important
topic of research.
Brain Activity during Sleep
Establishing a link between dreaming and its underlying neuro-
functional changes constitutes a major challenge for re-
searchers (Limosani et al. 2011) because dreaming arises from
brain activity that is largely independent of interactions with
external stimuli (Revonsuo 2006). Dream research typically
aims to retrospectively correlate neural activity with the dream
characteristics that are common to all dreams (e.g. dream bi-
zarreness—although varying tremendously depending on the
sleep stage) rather than the content of individual dreams (Nir
and Tononi 2010; but see Siclari et al. 2017). Periods of REM sleep,
NREM sleep, and lucid dreaming are characterized by patterns
of regional brain activity that are both similar and distinct from
those observed during wakefulness. In what follows, we review
studies on brain activity during REM and NREM sleep rather
than brain activity during REM and NREM ‘dreaming’ per se. As
such, it is important to note that the interpretations of these
findings are to some extent speculative, given that the methods
used in the majority of these studies do not allow for a separa-
tion of the duration of REM/NREM sleep and dreaming.
REM sleep
The REM sleep phase has most clearly been defined in terms of
neurofunctional activation (Fig. 1), which corresponds to some
of the key characteristics of the subjective experience of dream-
ing (e.g. vivid imagery as well as articulate and incongruous
storylines) (Limosani et al. 2011).
Similarities with wakefulness. The EEG signal during REM sleep
shares large similarities with that of wakefulness, and positron
emission tomography (PET) studies have shown that global
brain metabolism tends to be very similar as well (Hobson et al.
2000; Maquet 2000).
Hyperactivity. Several brain regions become particularly ac-
tive during REM sleep. There is strong metabolic activity in
higher-order occipito-temporal visual association areas, which
might be responsible for the often very vivid visual dream im-
agery during REM sleep (Braun et al. 1997; Nofzinger et al. 1997;
Maquet et al. 2000). Hyperactivity in motor regions such as the
primary motor and premotor cortices, the cerebellum, and the
basal ganglia may account for the frequently reported motor
content of dreams (Braun et al. 1997; Maquet et al. 2000).
Furthermore, increased levels of activity have been observed
in the pontine tegmentum, the thalamus, the basal forebrain,
as well as in limbic and paralimbic structures (e.g. amygdaloid
complexes, hippocampal formation, and anterior cingulate
cortex) (Maquet et al. 1996; Braun et al. 1997; Nofzinger et al.
1997). These brain regions are associated with emotional pro-
cessing and might be responsible for the often very intense
emotional aspects of REM sleep dreaming (Maquet and Phillips
1998; Hobson et al. 2000). There is also increased activity in
other regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex, circuits of
the medial temporal lobe region, and the posterior cingulate
cortex (Maquet et al. 1996; Braun et al. 1997, 1998; Nofzinger
et al. 1997; Fox et al. 2013), which are implicated in memory and
self-referential processing (Nofzinger et al. 1997; Ioannides
et al. 2009). In fact, there is striking overlap between the default
mode network (i.e. the network of brain regions that are active
when an individual is awake and not currently engaged in a
task), which is associated with self-referential processing, and
areas that become increasingly active during REM sleep (Fox
et al. 2013). This network may play a key role in both mind-
wandering and dreaming and possibly represents a
shared neural substrate of the two phenomena (Domhoff and
Fox 2015).
Hypoactivity. Even though several brain regions become
hyperactive during REM sleep, a number of structures show
decreased levels of activity. Among these structures is the
right inferior parietal cortex, which is involved in waking vo-
lition (Goldberg et al. 2008; Desmurget et al. 2009) and which
contributes to a unified representation of self and self versus
other perspectives (Farrer et al. 2003). Decreased activity of
the right inferior parietal cortex (Maquet et al. 1996; Braun
et al. 1997) might allow the dreamer to participate in both
first- and third-person perspectives (Maquet et al. 2005).
Moreover, there is deactivation of executive regions of the
prefrontal cortex such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) and the orbitofrontal cortex, but also in regions in-
cluding the posterior cingulate gyrus, the precuneus, and the
inferior parietal cortex. These areas are typically involved in
cognitive control, metacognition, and ego functions (e.g. ori-
entation in time and space, reality testing, and self-
monitoring) and may underlie the lack of insight, restricted
volitional capacities, and impaired metacognition during
dreaming (Maquet et al. 1996; Braun et al. 1997; Nofzinger
et al. 1997; Maquet 2000, 2005; Hobson and Pace-Schott 2002;
Schwartz and Maquet 2002; Fox et al. 2013). Hypoactivation of
the prefrontal cortex may also be a contributing factor for
dream amnesia (Fox et al. 2013).
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NREM sleep
The neuroscientific study of NREM dreaming (Fig. 2) only
emerged more recently, but findings tend to be more informa-
tive with regards to exploring the neural correlates of dreaming
because of methodological and data-analytical advances includ-
ing the use of computational learning algorithms. A recent
study by Horikawa et al. (2013) which utilized machine learning
techniques showed that visual imagery during sleep onset is
represented by brain regions including the early visual pathway,
fusiform face area, and parahippocampal place area. Brain ac-
tivity underlying these hypnagogic hallucinations may differ
from that underlying dreams occurring during REM sleep
though (Underwood 2013). Utilizing high-density EEG recordings
and performing serial awakenings, Siclari et al. (2017) showed
that dream reports following awakenings from the N2 stage
were preceded by ‘decreased’ low-frequency and ‘increased’
high-frequency power in bilateral parieto-occipital areas includ-
ing the medial and lateral occipital lobes as well as the precu-
neus and posterior cingulate gyrus (for high-frequency power,
the lateral frontal and temporal cortices showed increased ac-
tivity as well). Furthermore, the authors confirmed these find-
ings for sleep stages N2 and N3 in an independent sample and
irrespective of the dreamer’s ability to remember specific dream
contents.
Lucid dreaming
Periods of lucid dreaming show increased activity in areas such
as the DLPFC, bilateral frontopolar prefrontal cortex, and parie-
tal areas including the precuneus, the inferior parietal lobules,
and the supramarginal gyrus (Fig. 3). It has been suggested that
the fronto-parietal activity during lucid dreaming corresponds
to the reinstantiation of reflective capabilities (Dresler et al.
2015), thereby mediating features of secondary consciousness
(Dresler et al. 2012) such as metacognitive evaluation (Stuss et al.
2001; Schmitz et al. 2004; Fleming et al. 2012) and self-referential
processing (Cavanna and Trimble 2006). In fact, research on
the neural correlates of lucid dreaming might be key in
understanding the neural substrates of secondary conscious-
ness (Hobson and Voss 2010; Dresler et al. 2014). So far, the study
of lucid dreaming is limited to periods of REM sleep because the
classical method to investigate lucid dreaming, the eye-
signalling technique, is not applicable to NREM sleep (Dresler
et al. 2015). Furthermore, research on lucid dreaming mostly
pertains to case studies, and conclusions about the neural cor-
relates of lucid dreaming should be regarded as preliminary.
Neural Correlates of Dream Phenomenology
and Changes in Consciousness
The heterogeneous brain activity during sleep may explain
some of the typical features of, and variation across, dreams
during different stages of sleep (Desseilles et al. 2011). This is in
line with Pace-Schott (2010) who described dreaming as ‘an im-
precise experiential simulacrum [i.e. a representation or imita-
tion] of waking resulting from neurobiological processes that
must differ from those that generate waking consciousness.’
Consciousness
Decreased metabolic activity in the DLPFC during periods of
REM sleep might be responsible for reduced features of second-
ary consciousness, which return during periods of lucid dream-
ing when the DLPFC becomes more active again (Voss et al.
2009; Hobson and Voss 2010; Dresler et al. 2012). During REM
sleep dreaming, the dreamer thinks that he or she is awake,
which is a delusion that might be due to persistent inactivation
of frontal and parietal circuits necessary for waking memory,
self-reflective awareness, and insight. The global deactivation
of the pontine tegmentum, the amygdala, the anterior commis-
sure, the parietal operculum, deep frontal white matter, and the
mid-line thalamus during NREM sleep compared with waking,
and their subsequent reactivation during REM sleep might ex-
plain why some aspects of consciousness during REM sleep
might be more readily available than during NREM sleep
(Maquet et al. 1996; Braun et al. 1997; Nofzinger et al. 1997).
Figure 1. Schematic brain images showing increased and decreased activity of different brain areas during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. The
left panel shows a mid-line incision looking at the right hemisphere and the right panel shows a lateral surface of the brain. Areas highlighted
with dashed borders are deeper structures.
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However, preliminary findings suggest that localized activity
changes in the parieto-occipital region, irrespective of global ac-
tivity in the rest of the cortex, may constitute a marker of con-
scious experience during sleep (Siclari et al. 2017). The neural
correlates of lucid dreaming largely overlap with brain areas
that are involved in self-reflective thought and subserve voli-
tional capabilities (Voss et al. 2009; Hobson and Voss 2010;
Dresler et al. 2014).
Phenomenology
According to the principle of perceptual equivalence (Finke
1989), there are common neural substrates for perception and
imagery. Some of the visual experiences during the sleep onset
phase are represented by brain activity patterns that are similar
to the ones observed during stimulus perception (Horikawa
et al. 2013), and activation in visual-occipital and auditory-
temporal cortices during REM sleep may underlie the visual and
auditory elements that are frequently reported after awaken-
ings from REM sleep (Braun et al. 1997). In line with this, patients
with extrastriate occipito-temporal lesions report cessation of
visual dream imagery (Solms 1997). Several other behaviours
share similar neural correlates during wakefulness and dream-
ing (Erlacher and Schredl 2008; Siclari et al. 2017). For instance,
dream hand movements activate the same areas of the motor
cortex that are active when actually executing hand movements
during wakefulness (Dresler et al. 2011). Since a range of subcor-
tical and neocortical structures that are active during waking
are also active during REM sleep, but inactive during NREM
sleep, this might explain why the phenomenological experience
of dreaming during REM sleep is much more diverse than dur-
ing NREM sleep (Hobson 2009). For instance, waking emotional
processes that are active during REM sleep are inhibited during
NREM sleep, and mechanisms governing sensory vividness of
imagery are enhanced in REM sleep while being inhibited during
periods of NREM sleep (Carr and Nielsen 2015).
Figure 2. Schematic brain images showing increased and decreased activity of different brain areas during non-rapid eye movement (NREM)
sleep. The left panel shows a mid-line incision looking at the right hemisphere and the right panel shows a lateral surface of the brain. Areas
highlighted with dashed borders are deeper structures.
Figure 3. Schematic brain images showing increased and decreased activity of different brain areas during lucid dreaming. The left panel shows
a mid-line incision looking at the right hemisphere and the right panel shows a lateral surface of the brain.
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Conclusion and Future Directions
In what follows we will highlight some important shortcomings
that have emerged from reviewing the current literature on the
neural correlates of dreaming and we will suggest potential
ways to address these in future research.
1. Given that most research has focused on the study of REM
sleep, much remains to be learned about the mechanisms
underlying dreaming during NREM sleep. Future investiga-
tions should more systematically contrast the different
phases of NREM sleep with wakefulness, REM sleep, and pe-
riods of lucid dreaming. Recent efforts in dream research
have investigated whether daytime naps are suitable for
sampling and comparing dreaming during REM and NREM
sleep. It was shown that recall rates for REM and NREM naps
were slightly elevated to normal night-time recall rates (Carr
and Nielsen 2015), making it perhaps an even more efficient
tool to study dreams.
2. Causal links have—until recently—not received much atten-
tion in the literature on dreaming. Novel brain stimulation
methods including transcranial alternating current stimula-
tion (tACS) and transcranial magnetic stimulation can be
used to make causal inferences on the relationship between
brain activity and behaviour (e.g. Nieminen et al. 2016). For
example, tACS has recently been utilized to experimentally
induce lucid dreaming (Noreika et al. 2010; Stumbrys et al.
2013; Voss et al. 2014), and might hence be a valuable tool for
a more systematic study of the neural substrates of
dreaming.
3. No objective assessment (or verification) of dreams is cur-
rently possible and researchers rely exclusively on the col-
lection of subjective dream reports. These are being
obtained only after a change in vigilance state has oc-
curred, which might alter the quality and content of the re-
port (Kusse´ et al. 2010). Novel brain imaging methods, in
terms of both hardware (e.g. functional near-infrared spec-
troscopy, fNIR or fNIRS; Dresler et al. 2011), and software
(statistical learning or machine learning algorithms; Huth
et al. 2016; Wen et al. 2016, preprint; Zurawel et al. 2016)
may enable a more objective readout of the dream. This is
particularly important considering that (i) memory is re-
constructive and there is a time lag between the actual
dream and its report, (ii) the original dream content may be
distorted due to interfering material of the waking environ-
ment, (iii) there are limitations inherent to verbal reports,
and (iv) moral censorship (Hobson et al. 2000; Windt 2013).
Moreover, the absence of dream reports does not necessar-
ily imply an absence of dreaming, since these are easily
and quickly forgotten.
4. At present, most researchers are working in highly special-
ized fields (e.g. research on sleep and lucid dreaming), po-
tentially overlooking knowledge in other relevant areas
(e.g. coma and vegetative state) that could benefit their own
discipline. To gain a more comprehensive understanding of
the mechanisms underlying consciousness, cross-fertiliza-
tion between multiple fields is necessary.
5. Some evidence suggests that dream lucidity training can
be applied in clinical settings as a form of nightmare ther-
apy (Spoormaker et al. 2003; Spoormaker and Van Den
Bout 2006). Although the mechanism of action of lucid
dreaming is not fully understood, examining the charac-
teristics of patients for whom this type of therapy seems
effective may shed light on the nature of lucid dreaming
itself.
6. Understanding the mechanisms underlying consciousness
in the healthy human brain might enable us to identify pro-
cesses that are dysfunctional in pathologies, thereby en-
abling us to develop better treatments. For instance, lucid
dreaming might be of therapeutic value in sleep disorders
and for individuals experiencing frequent nightmares. At
the same time, studies on the neural correlates of dreaming
in clinical populations are informative: for example, a recent
study by Dodet et al. (2015) has shown that comparing indi-
viduals with and without narcolepsy can elucidate the na-
ture of lucid dreaming.
Due to limited space, only a small number of studies on
pathological states were included in the present review.
Moreover, research on altered states of consciousness that oc-
cur during meditation (Lutz et al. 2007), hypnosis (Rainville and
Price 2003), vegetative states (Owen et al. 2006), coma (Laureys
and Schiff 2012), or drug use (Carhart-Harris et al. 2014) could
not be discussed here.
The study of dreaming is of major importance insofar as it
helps to more fully understand consciousness. It offers a unique
opportunity to gain insight into the processes and mechanisms
involved in waking consciousness through studying the similar-
ities with, and differences from, dream consciousness.
However, we have only just started to understand the neural
correlates of dreaming.
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